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Abstract 
In this paper we assess the impact of structural funds on the per capita GDP and 
employment convergence process of 145 European regions over 1989–1999. This paper 
goes beyond the recent contributions on European regional policies and convergence 
since each of the five objectives of regional support is studied and spatial effects are 
included in the analysis. For this purpose we use spatial econometrics to include the re-
levant spatial effects in the estimation of the appropriate conditional ȕ-convergence 
model. The impact of the funds and their spatial lag indicate few significant results, 
and when they are, their extent is very small or even negative. This raises some doubts 
on the efficiency of regional support and call for a deep reform for the next programm-
ing period. 
1. Introduction 
Regional development policies find their origin in the different phases of Euro-
pean integration. Each enlargement, and more especially the one to Greece in 1981 
and the one to Spain and Portugal in 1986, has increased per capita GDP disparities 
among member states, which has, thereafter, given rise to a new solidarity instru-
ment. Indeed, regional development differences can not be passively accepted by 
European authorities because of equity grounds and common policies. From an equi-
ty perspective, the European Commission does not tolerate that agents having similar 
characteristics may receive different incomes only because they live in different places. 
From an integration and common policy perspective, installing the Common Market 
necessitated new transport infrastructures in order to facilitate free circulation of 
goods and labor all over the territory. In addition, a certain level of convergence was 
required before introducing the common currency. For the least developed countries, 
it meant that heavy investments were necessary, but under the constraint of a reduced 
public debt and deficit. The only solution was therefore to develop the appropriate in-
struments of solidarity. 
More recently, the evaluation of regional development policies has known a 
tremendous renewed interest for two reasons. First, on the eve of a deep reform and 
negotiations on European budget perspectives over 2007–2013, the usefulness and 
the existence itself of these policies have been questioned by some economists, in-
cluding the authors of the Sapir report (Sapir et al., 2003), which was given a lot of 326                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8
media coverage. They estimate that the direct costs of funds are too high (one-third of 
the EU budget is devoted to regional policies) and underline the fact that funds tend to 
reduce the agglomeration process, and thus harm global growth. Second, the recent 
enlargement to ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe, of which per capita GDP 
level is much lower than that of the EU15 members, challenges regional policies in 
an unprecedented way. Their integration has statistically reduced the average Commu-
nity per capita GDP by 13 % (European Commission, 2003). Their allocation after 2007 
will be more complicated since it will have to consider the development gap of not only 
the poor regions of the EU15, but also nearly all the regions of the new members. 
In order to debate on the suitability of regional policies, this paper focuses on 
the 1989–1999 period during which cohesion efforts have been formally set up and 
developed, and because more recent data do not exist. In addition, we pay special 
attention to the geographical localization of each assisted region and the existence of 
potential linkages between them. More precisely, our paper differentiates itself from 
the numerous studies on regional income convergence that have followed the famous 
works of Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1995)
1 which are based on the same under-
lying hypotheses as the ones used in international convergence estimation. Indeed, 
we do not accept to consider regions as isolated entities. As a result, we resort to spa-
tial econometrics to formally include the relevant spatial effects. The choice of this 
technique is reinforced by the fact that regional funds are at the origin of numerous 
externalities among regions. Indeed, the major part of these funds finance transpor-
tation infrastructures that influence the firm localization process and favor agglo-
meration  in  the  rich  regions  (Venables,  Gasiorek,  1999),  (Vickerman  et  al.,  1999). 
These spatial effects are not included in most of the studies on the impact of regional 
policies. However, a noticeable exception is the recent work by Dall’erba and Le Gallo 
(2007) who conclude to a non-significant impact of the funds on regional growth. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of recent studies on 
the impact of regional growth policies. In a general way, their results are not unani-
mous and lead to a non-significant or very small impact. In Section 3, we present 
the data which are original compared to other studies because they represent the five 
different objectives of structural funds and the Community initiatives over 1989–1999. 
We also introduce the spatial weight matrix and define the spatial effects that will be 
considered in the next section. Indeed, Section 4 estimates, first, the impact of each 
of the funds and of the total Community project cost. This includes investment ef-
forts taking the form of additional funds by the region itself. Second, we estimate 
the impact of both the funds (Community project total cost) and their spatial lag on 
growth. Section 5 uses the same tools to focus on their impact on employment share 
in the labor force. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper and gives some comments 
on the sector allocation of structural funds. 
2. Literature Review 
Two strands of literature provide insights into the effects of public assistance 
and infrastructures on regional growth and location of economic activity: growth 
models and economic geography models. In a neoclassical Solow growth model, re-
1See (Durlauf, Quah, 1999) for an extended review of this literature. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        327
gional funds finance a greater level of physical capital, which corresponds to a higher 
steady  state  income.  However,  due  to  the  decreasing  marginal  product  of  capital, 
the rate of investment declines towards the steady state income, where the stock of ca-
pital per person is constant. The investment rate is then equal to effective capital depre-
ciation. Therefore, a higher investment rate in poorer regions may increase the conver-
gence speed to rich regions, but is only transitional and does not raise the long-run 
growth rate. Conversely, endogenous growth theory grants public policies an important 
role in the determination of growth rates in the long run. For instance, Aschauer (1989) 
and Barro (1990) predict that if public infrastructures are an input in the production 
function, then policies financing new public infrastructures increase the marginal pro-
duct of private capital, hence fostering capital accumulation and growth. 
When such investments finance transportation infrastructures that yield a de-
crease in transportation costs, it may affect the process of industry location and favor 
agglomeration in rich regions. For example, Boarnet (1998) shows that highway pro-
jects in Californian counties benefit the investing counties at the expense of the other 
counties within the state. Kelejian and Robinson (1997) make similar arguments con-
cerning externalities at the state level. However, the economic geography literature 
shows that transportation infrastructures do not systematically benefit the regions 
where they are implemented, more especially when they are used as regional develop-
ment instruments (Vickerman, 1996), (Martin, Rogers, 1995), (Martin, 2000). In par-
ticular, with 30 % of structural funds devoted to transportation infrastructures, their 
impact on regional development has to be seen in the light of the characteristics of 
the transportation sector. The empirical study by Vickerman et al. (1999) points out 
that new transportation infrastructures tend to be built within or between rich regions, 
where the demand in this sector is the highest. Moreover, Puga and Venables (1997) 
show that in a transportation network based on hub-and-spoke interconnections, 
firms located in the hub face lower transaction costs in trading with firms in spoke 
locations than a firm in any spoke location trading with a firm in another spoke. As 
a consequence, this type of network promotes gains in accessibility in the hub loca-
tion first (Puga, 2001;), (Venables, Gasiorek, 1999). The relationship between gain in 
accessibility and economic development in peripheral regions still requires consider-
able empirical investigation, especially given the variations in transportation de-
mands by sector. It is stated however that gains in accessibility due to interregional 
transport infrastructures will always be relatively higher in the central location than in 
the peripheral ones (Vickerman et al., 1999). Therefore, transportation infra-structures 
cannot always be seen as an efficient instrument to reduce interregional disparities. 
The role of the above discussion is to highlight the obvious creation of spatial 
externalities due to the implementation of regional funds and therefore the need to 
formally include spatial dependencies in our model. Of course, we clearly do not 
claim that all the regions have financed transportation infrastructures through regional 
funds (actually the sectoral allocation of these funds for each region is unknown) nor 
that they are the only type of public investments financed. Regional policy instru-
ments are also devoted to improve either regional competitiveness as a whole or 
the incentives to locate at the level of each firm. Human capital formation or the im-
provement of infrastructures (in the transportation, telecommunications, energy and 
education  sectors)  belong  to  the  first  category  whilst  support  to  private  capital  in-
vestment through capital grants or tax breaks belongs to the latter one. 328                                Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8
Many recent empirical studies have investigated the impact of regional funds 
on development. De la Fuente and Vives (1995) show that promoting education has 
significantly contributed to the reduction of per capita income inequalities among 
17 regions of Spain between 1980 and 1991. Boldrin and Canova (2001) conclude 
that regional and structural policies mostly serve a redistributional purpose, but have 
little relationship to fostering economic growth. Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) 
focus on different expenditure axes. They find no significant impact of funds devoted 
to infrastructures or to business support. Only investment in education and human ca-
pital has medium-term positive effects, whilst support for agriculture has short-term 
positive effects on growth. A large agricultural sector and lack of R&D are the two 
main reasons that hamper growth and regional development efforts in poor regions 
according to Cappelen et al. (2003). Finally, Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) 
find that European Structural Funds expenditure has an effect on the location of in-
dustry, notably by encouraging R&D-intensive industries to locate in countries and 
regions that have low endowments of skilled labor. As a result, these incentives have 
mostly been acting counter to states’ comparative advantages and have not allowed 
poor regions to catch-up to the EU average. 
More studies could be cited but this is not the topic of this paper, which, as 
noted earlier, pays special attention to the presence of spatial externalities induced by 
the implementation of regional funds, which is not the case of the papers cited above. 
For this purpose, we take spatial effects into account in the estimation of the impact 
of structural funds on the regional growth rate. These spatial effects are described in 
the next section. 
3.  Data and Weight Matrix 
The data on per capita GDP and employment share in the labor force come from 
the Eurostat Regio database (2001). This is the official database used by the European 
Commission for its evaluation of regional convergence. The data on per capita struc-
tural funds come from three reports by the EU Commission (European Commission, 
1992a, 1992b, 1999) and cover two programming periods: 1989–1993, 1994–1999. 
Data for 1994–1999 are the total payments plus the commitments taken during this 
period, but that have not been paid yet. The inexistence of more recent data leads us to 
assume that structural funds commitments and expenditures are strongly correlated. We 
are aware that this may create some problems, as considerable lags between the com-
mitments and actual expenditure often take place. We consider the five objectives as 
well as the Community Initiatives which can be described as follows
2:
– Objective 1 funds were dedicated to the economic adaptation of the least 
developed regions and allocated to the NUTS 2
3 regions of which GDP per capita in 
PPS (Purchasing Power Standard) was below 75 % of the Community average.  
– Objective 2 funds were devoted to the economic recovery of regions af-
fected by an industrial crisis. 
– Objective 3 funds tended to reduce long-term unemployment and improve 
the insertion of young people into working life. 
2 For a more detailed discussion on each objective, see (Dall’erba, 2003) 
3 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. The European Commission divides its territory according
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– Objective 4 funds were targeted to facilitate the adaptation of workers and 
retraining  focused  on  changes  in  industry  changes  and  changes  in  the  production 
process. Because of the data, (funds of Objectives 3 and 4) will be considered together. 
– Objective 5 funds were targeted to foster the adaptation of agricultural and 
fisheries structures within the framework of the reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
– The Community Initiatives, which started in 1994, focus on various aspects 
of regional development, like interregional cooperation, employment, and economic 
restructuring. 
In addition to the amount of structural funds, we also consider the total cost 
of Community projects for each objective, which equals the sum of structural funds 
and additional funds. Indeed, a particular project is never implemented without ad-
ditional regional or national financing. This is the principle of additionality that 
would preclude regions presenting dubious projects.
4 This rule may introduce a bias 
due to the fact that poor regions often have difficulty matching European aid, whereas 
the aid can be tripled or quadrupled in regions with medium or high income levels, 
as they have more fiscal capacity to complement structural funds (Martin, 1998), 
(Dall’erba, 2004). 
We consider 145 European regions at the NUTS II level: Belgium (11 re-
gions), Denmark (1 region), Germany (30 regions; Berlin and the nine former East 
German regions are excluded due to historical reasons), Greece (13 regions), Spain 
(16 regions, as we exclude the remote islands: Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 
Canary Islands, and Ceuta y Mellila), France (22 regions), Ireland (2 regions), Italy 
(20 regions), Netherlands (12 regions), Portugal (5 regions; the Azores and Madeira are 
excluded because of their geographical distance), Luxembourg (1 region), the United 
Kingdom (12 regions; we use regions at the NUTS I level, because NUTS II regions 
are not used as governmental units; they are merely statistical inventions of the EU 
Commission and the UK government). 
The particular specification of the weights matrix, upon which all the esti-
mations rely, depends on European geography, which does not allow us to consider 
simple contiguity matrices; otherwise the weights matrix would include rows and co-
lumns with only zeros for the islands. Since unconnected observations are eliminated 
from the results of spatial autocorrelation statistics, this would change the sample 
size and the interpretation of statistical inference. More precisely, we use the great 
circle distance between regional centroids. Distance and time-based weight matrices 
are defined as: 
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4 Community funds support up to 75 % of total public expenditure in NUTS regions; the rest depends on
national or regional additionality in order to avoid regions’ present unviable projects. The ceilings vary 
according to the objective concerned: Objective 1 financed a maximum of 75 % of the total cost, but 80 % 
in cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) and 85 % in the most remote regions and 
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where 
*
ij w  is an element of the unstandardized weight matrix;  ij w  is an element of 
the standardized weight matrix;  ij d  is the great circle distance (or time) between cen-
troids of region i and j; D(1) = Q1, D(2) = Me and D(3) = Q3, Q1, Me and Q3 are 
respectively the lower quartile, the median and the upper quartile of the great circle 
distance (or time) distribution. D(k) is the cutoff parameter for  1,...3 k    above 
which interactions are assumed negligible. We use the inverse of the squared distance 
(time) in order to reflect a gravity function. Each matrix is row standardized so that it 
is the relative and not absolute distance (time) which matters.
5
The weight matrices will allow us to detect and include the relevant spatial 
effects in the estimation of the impact of structural funds. These spatial effects take 
the form of spatial autocorrelation and/or spatial heterogeneity. The former refers to 
the coincidence of attribute similarity and locational similarity (Anselin, 1988, 2001). 
In our case, spatial autocorrelation means that rich regions tend to be geographically 
clustered, as are poor regions. The second spatial effect means that economic behaviors 
are not stable over space. This can be linked to the concept of convergence clubs, cha-
racterized by the possibility of multiple, locally stable, steady state equilibriums (Dur-
lauf, Johnson, 1995). 
4.  Impact of Regional Support on the Convergence Process 
Using the spatial weight matrices previously described, the first step of our 
analysis is to detect the existence of spatial heterogeneity in the distribution of regi-
onal per capita GDPs. For this purpose, we use the G-I
* statistics developed by Ord 
and Getis (1995).
6 These statistics are computed for each region and they allow de-
tecting the presence of local spatial autocorrelation: a positive value of this statistic 
for region i indicates a spatial cluster of high values, whereas a negative value indi-
cates a spatial clustering of low values around region i. Based on these statistics, we 
determine our spatial regimes, which can be interpreted as spatial convergence clubs, 
using the following rule: if the statistic for region i is positive, then this region be-
longs to the group of “rich” regions and if the statistic for region i is negative, then 
this region belongs to the group of “poor” regions. 
For all weight matrices described above two spatial regimes are persistent 
over the period and highlight some form of spatial heterogeneity:
7
– 100 regions belong to the spatial regime “Core”: Belgium, Germany, Den-
mark, France, Italy (except Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia), 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and North West), 
– 45 regions belong to the spatial regime “Periphery”: Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
Southern Italy (Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily), Portugal, and 
the north of the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, Scotland and North West). 
5 For comparison purposes, weight matrices based on the number of nearest neighbors are also generated. 
6 All computations in this section are carried out using the SpaceStat 1.91 software (Anselin, 1999). 
7 We do not define our regimes according to the results of the Moran scatterplot to avoid eliminating 9 re-
gions of our sample. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        331
The second step of our analysis consists in including both spatial effects in 
the estimation of the appropriate ȕ-convergence model. In order to identify the form 
of the spatial dependence (spatial error model or spatial lag), the Lagrange Multiplier 
tests (resp. LMERR and LMLAG) and their robust version (resp. R-LMERR and 
R-LMLAG) are performed. The decision rule suggested by Anselin and Florax (1995)
8
leads us to a spatial error model. In addition, various tests aimed at detecting the pre-
sence of spatial effects, described in (Anselin, 1988), indicate the presence of spatial 
heterogeneity taking the form of groupwise heteroskedascticity and structural insta-
bility defined according to the spatial regimes previously defined. The form of the ap-
propriate ȕ-convergence model with structural funds is therefore the following: 
00 TC C C C C C P P P P P P DD y D DD y D F D S D EG D EG H       gF D S



















¨¸ «» ¬¼ ©¹
          (2) 
where gT is the (nu1) vector of average growth rates of per capita GDP between 
date 0 and T; S is the (nu1) sum vector; y0 is the vector of log per capita GDP levels 
at date 0, FDS is the (1 ) nu  vector of per capita structural funds/total project cost and 
Ȝ is a coefficient indicating the extent of spatial correlation between the residuals. DC
and DP are dummy variables corresponding respectively to the core and periphery 
regimes previously defined;  C D , P D , C E , P E , C G , P G  are the unknown parameters 
to be estimated, and 
2 ˆH V  represents the variance within each regime. 
Estimation results by Maximum Likelihood are displayed in Table 1. They are 
confirmed by GMM estimation. The results indicate that there is significant conver-
gence among the regions belonging to the periphery regime (p-value = 0.004) leading 
to a convergence speed of 3.55 and a half-life of 25.22 years.
9 On the other hand, 
the convergence coefficient in the core regime is not significant. The error term are 
significantly (p-value = 0.000) and spatially autocorrelated, which indicates that 
the growth rate of a region is significantly influenced by the growth rate of its sur-
rounding regions. While none of the structural funds has a significant impact on 
the core regions, objectives 1 and 3&4 funds and the Community Initiatives have a sig-
nificant but very small impact on the convergence process of the peripheral regions. 
We note that this impact is positive only for Community Initiatives, which may ap-
pear surprising when one knows the massive amount of Objective  1 funds that 
peripheral regions have benefited from over the study period. The same conclusions 
hold for the total cost of Community projects. The Chow test of overall stability 
rejects the joint null hypothesis on the equality of the regimes’ coefficients, which is 
8 If LMLAG (resp. LMERR) is more significant than LMERR (resp. LMLAG) and R-LMLAG (resp. 
R-LMERR) is significant whereas R-LMERR (resp. R-LMLAG) is not, then the most appropriate model is
the spatial autoregressive model (resp. the spatial error model). 
9 The convergence speed is the speed necessary for an economy to reach it steady-state. It may be defined 
as ln(1 )/ bT T E    . The half-life is the time necessary for an economy to fill half of the variation,
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confirmed by the individual coefficient stability tests. The LR test confirms the pre-
sence of two significantly different variances across regimes. 
The lack of significant impact of structural funds or total project cost on the re-
gional convergence process is confirmed in Table 2, which shows the impact of total 
funds. We find again that peripheral regions are the only ones to converge with each 
other. 
Since a significant part of regional funds are devoted to interregional infra-
structures, as we have seen in Section 2, we test in a final step the impact of the funds 
and their spatial lags on the convergence process. The appropriate model is once 
again a model with spatial error dependence and spatial heterogeneity under the form 
of structural instability and groupwise heteroscedasticity. Estimation results, dis-
played in Table 3, indicate the presence of significant convergence only within the pe-
ripheral regime. With regard to the regional funds, only Objective 3 and 4, Com-
munity Initiatives and the lag of Objective 2 funds have a significant, but small, im- 
TABLE 1  Impact of Structural Funds and Total Cost Project on the Convergence Process 
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diagnostics 

















































































































































Speed - 3.55 %  - 3.39 % 









-life  - 25.22  - 26.13 
Sq. 
Corr.  0.385  0.347 
LIK    509.259    510.167 
AIC  -990.519  -992.334 
SC -948.844  -950.660 
Notes: Sq. Corr. is the squared correlation between predicted values and actual values. LIK is value of the ma-
ximum likelihood function. AIC is the Akaike information criterion. SC is the Schwarz information cri-
terion. The individual coefficient stability tests are based on a spatially adjusted asymptotic Wald statis-
tics, distributed as Ȥ
2 with 1 degree of freedom. The Chow-Wald test of overall stability is also based on 
a spatially adjusted asymptotic Wald statistic, distributed as Ȥ
2 with 2 degrees of freedom (Anselin,, 
1988). LR is the likelihood ratio test for groupwise heteroskedasticity. p-values are in parentheses. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        333
pact on peripheral regions, whereas core regions seem affected by the lag of Ob-
jective 5 funds only. With regard to the total project cost, peripheral regions are af-
fected by the same funds as previously plus Objective 2 and the lag of Objective 1 
funds. In the case of structural funds and total project cost, the results indicate that 
the lags have a more important impact than the funds allocated to the region itself. 
This may be due to the fact that they represent a much greater amount. Finally, we 
note that the lag of Objective 5 is still the only fund to impact the core regions’ 
growth. 
The larger and more significant impact of the lags is confirmed when studying 
the impact of total funds. Indeed, Table 4 shows that while peripheral regions are 
the only ones to converge, the lag of structural funds or the lag of total project cost 
have a significant impact on their convergence process. These last results maintain 
some credibility in the necessity for regional assistance compared to the results of 
the previous tables. 
5.  Impact of Regional Support on Employment 
Per capita GDP regional growth is not the only purpose of regional assis-
tance. Indeed, while Objective 3 and 4 funds as well as some Community Initiatives 
clearly have the objective of reducing unemployment, Objective 2 funds may also 
correspond to this idea. In the case of employment share in the labor force, the tools 
described in the previous section enable the appearance of two spatial regimes: 
– 101 regions belong to the “North-West” spatial regime with a  high em-
ployment share: Belgium, Germany, Denmark, the East of France (i.e. France with 
TABLE 2  Impact of Total Structural Funds and Total Cost Project on The Convergence 
Process




Core  Periph.  Core  Periph.  Specification 
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Speed  - 4.88 %  - 4.71 % 








-life  - 20.08  - 20.57 
Sq. 
Corr.  0.325  0.326 
LIK   503.995   503.694 
AIC  -995.990  -995.388 
SC -978.129  -977.528 
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the exception of Pays de la Loire, Bretagne, Poitou Charentes, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyré-
nées, Limousin, Auvergne, Languedoc Roussillon), Northern Italy (i.e. Italy with the ex-
ception of Lazzio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, 
Sardinia), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (except Wales, Nor-
thern Ireland, Scotland and North West), and Greece. 
– 44 regions belong to the spatial regime “South-East” with a low employ-
ment share: Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Southern Italy (Lazzio, Abruzzo, Molise, Cam-
pania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia), the West of France (Pays de la Loi-
re, Bretagne, Poitou Charentes, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées, Limousin, Auvergne, Lan-
guedoc-Roussillon), the North of the United Kingdom (Wales, Northern Ireland, Scot-
land and North West). 
TABLE 3 Impact of Structural Funds and Total Project Cost, and Their Respective Lags 
on the Convergence Process 
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Speed  - 3.30 %  - 3.06 % 







Half-life - 26.68  - 28.23 
Sq.
Corr. 0.630  0.617 
LIK    513.069    515.852 
AIC  -978.138  -983.703 
SC -906.696  -912.262 
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TABLE 4  Impact of Total Structural Funds, Total Project Cost and Their Respective Lags 
on the Convergence Process 


























































































Speed  - 4.02 %  - 3.99 % 







Half-life  - 22.98 - 23.12
Sq. Corr.  0.403 0.425
LIK   505.169   505.068 
AIC  -994.339  -994.136 
SC -970.525  -970.322 
Note: See notes for Table 1. 
TABLE 5  Impact of Structural Funds and Total Cost Project on Employment 
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AIC -1320.63 -1320.52
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In the case of employment share, the appropriate ȕ-convergence model is a spa-
tial lag model with structural instability as follows:  
00 TT C C CC CC PP PP PP gW g D D y D F D SD D y D F D S ODE G DE G H      
with   
2 ~( 0 , ) u NI HV             (3) 
Estimation results by Maximum Likelihood are displayed in Table 5.
10 On 
the opposite of the previous section, we do not detect any significant convergence of 
employment growth among regimes. The spatial lag coefficient is significant (p-va-
lue = 0.000) which means that the growth rate of employment in one region is po-
sitively and significantly determined by the one of its neighbors. Only the impact of 
Objective 2 funds in South-Western regions employment is significant.  
When estimating the impact of total funds on employment, the results dis-
played in Table 6 do not indicate any significant coefficient, except the one on the spa-
tial lag dependence and the regimes’ variance. We also note that spatial heterogeneity 
takes the form of groupwise heteroskedascticity in this case.  
When we include the spatial lag of the funds, the results of Table 7 indicate 
that several objectives and their lag act significantly on regional employment. In 
the case of the South-Western regions, Objective 1, 2, and the lag of Objective 1, 
3 and 4, 5 (to some extent) and of Community Initiatives have a significant impact on 
employment. The same funds (except Objective 2 funds and the lag of CI) impact 
significantly on the North-Eastern regions. As in the previous section, the extent of 
the impact of the lag is greater than the one of the funds allocated to the region itself. 
We reach the same conclusions for the total project cost with the exception that none 
of the funds lag is significant in the South-Western regions.
Finally, the results in Table 8 indicate neither significant impact of total funds 
nor their lag on employment growth. We do not detect the presence of spatial re-
gimes and the spatial lag is significant, like in table 6.
TABLE 6  Impact of Total Structural Funds and Total Cost Project on Employment 
Structural funds  Total cost  Structural 
funds
Total cost 






































Speed - - - -
Half-life - - - -
Sq. Corr.  0.634 0.635
LIK      669.229       669.207 
AIC -1330.46 -1330.41
SC -1318.55 -1318.51
Note: See notes for Table 1. 
10 Results are confirmed by Instrumental Variables estimation. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 7-8                                        337
6. Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted the importance of including spatial effects when 
studying the impact of regional funds on regional growth or employment. Indeed, re-
gional funds finance interregional infrastructures, mainly devoted to reduce transpor-
tation costs, which create spatial dependence among regions. Estimation results that 
we have performed on the ȕ-convergence model have shown that per capita GDP 
growth and employment growth of each region is positively and significantly affect-
ed by the growth level of its neighboring regions. In addition, we have paid special 
TABLE 7  Impact of Structural Funds, Total Project Cost and Their Respective Lags 
on Employment 




N-E  S-W  N-E  S-W  Specif. 
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LIK       688.997      683.948 
AIC  -1327.99  -1317.90 







SC -1253.58  -1243.48 
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attention to the role played by each of the five objectives of structural funds over 
1989–1999 and by additional funds financed by regional or national authorities. First, 
the results have indicated for both variables that the growth process is different 
between core and peripheral regions. In the case of employment, the divide takes 
the form of North-East versus South-West patterns. It also means that the impact of 
structural funds may differ according to the regime the assisted region belongs to.  
When looking at the impact of funds on the convergence process, the core re-
gions do not seem to be affected by regional assistance. Peripheral regions are sig-
nificantly but very little affected by some structural funds (objectives 1 and 3 and 4 
funds and Community Initiatives). The same conclusions hold for the Community 
projects total cost. When we add the lag of each fund as an explanatory variable, pe-
ripheral regions are affected by objective 3 and 4, Community Initiatives and the lag of 
Objective 2 funds while core regions are affected by Objective 5 funds only. The lag of 
Objective 1 funds also affects peripheral regions in the case of total project cost. This 
last result may reflect some “bias” introduced by additional funds. We note also that 
the significant impact of the lags is always greater than the one of the funds allocated to 
the region itself. Peripheral regions seem therefore more affected by the funds received 
by their neighbors, as is highlighted in the estimation of the impact of total funds.  
Finally, since regional funds are also devoted to support regional employment, 
we have estimated the impact of funds on the growth of this variable. Results show 
that Objective 2 funds are the only one to impact significantly South-Western regions 
(initially low employment regions). Including the lag of the funds indicate the signi-
ficant impact of Objective 1, 2, and the lag of objective 1, 3 and 4, 5 (to some extent) 
and of Community Initiatives on these regions’ employment. The same funds (except 
Objective 2 funds and the lag of CI) impact significantly the North-Eastern regions 
TABLE 8  Impact of Total Structural Funds, Total Project Costs and Their Lags 
on Employment 





















































Speed - - - -
Half-life - - - -
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(initially high employment regions). All in all, these results do not show a significant 
impact of structural funds nor total project cost on regional per capita GDP or em-
ployment growth. While objective 1 funds are supposed to enhance the development 
level of peripheral regions and objective 3 and 4 funds the employment level in low 
employment regions, we dot not necessarily find a significant impact of these funds 
on their designated objective. When the impact is significant, its extent is pretty low 
or, sometimes, negative. These results raise some doubts about the efficiency of re-
gional assistance over 1989–1999 and call for a deep reform for the new programm-
ing period. 
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